When logic programming is based on the proof theory of intuitionistic logic, it is natural to allow implications in goals and in the bodies of clauses. Attempting to prove a goal of the form D G from the context (set of formulas) ? leads to an attempt to prove the goal G in the extended context ? fDg. Thus during the bottom-up search for a cut-free proof contexts, represented as the left-hand side of intuitionistic sequents, grow as stacks. While such an intuitionistic notion of context provides for elegant speci cations of many computations, contexts can be made more expressive and exible if they are based on linear logic. After presenting two equivalent formulations of a fragment of linear logic, we show that the fragment has a goal-directed interpretation, thereby partially justifying calling it a logic programming language. Logic programs based on the intuitionistic theory of hereditary Harrop formulas can be modularly embedded into this linear logic setting. Programming examples taken from theorem proving, natural language parsing, and data base programming are presented: each example requires a linear, rather than intuitionistic, notion of context to be modeled adequately. An interpreter for this logic programming language must address the problem of splitting contexts; that is, when attempting to prove a multiplicative conjunction (tensor), say G 1 G 2 , from the context , the latter must be split into disjoint contexts 1 and 2 for which G 1 follows from 1 and G 2 follows from 2 . Since there is an exponential number of such splits, it is important to delay the choice of a split as much as possible. A mechanism for the lazy splitting of contexts is presented based on viewing proof search as a process that takes a context, consumes part of it, and returns the rest (to be consumed elsewhere). In addition, we use collections of Kripke interpretations indexed by a commutative monoid to provide models for this logic programming language and show that logic programs admit a canonical model.
Introduction
Fragments of intuitionistic rst-order and higher-order logics are commonly used as speci cation languages and logic programming languages. For example, rst-order and higher-order versions of hereditary Harrop formulas (formulas with no positive occurrences of disjunctions or existential quanti ers) have been used both as speci cation languages for proof systems (Felty, 1993; Felty and Miller, 1988; Paulson, 1990; Pfenning, 1988) and as the basis of logic programming languages (Gabbay and Reyle, 1984; Halln as and Schroeder-Heister, 1990; McCarty, 1988; Miller, 1990; Miller, Nadathur, Pfenning, and Scedrov, 1991) . Part of the expressiveness of such systems derives from This paper appeared in a special issue of Information and Computation Volume. 110, No. 2, May 1994. the proof rule that states that in order to prove an implication D G from the context (set of assumptions) ?, rst augment the context with D and attempt a proof of G in the new context.
That is, the sequent ? ?! D G has a proof if and only if ? fDg ?! G has a proof.
The stack-like left-hand side of sequents in intuitionistic sequent proofs can be exploited by programs in many ways. In theorem provers, they can be used to store the current assumptions and eigen-variables of a proof; in natural language parsers, they can be used to store assumed gaps when parsing relative clauses; in data base programs, they can be used to store the state of the data base; in logic programs, they can be used to provide a basis for modular programming, local declarations, and abstract data types.
While intuitionistic contexts naturally address computing concerns in a large number of applications, in others they are too limiting. One problem that appears frequently is that, speaking operationally, once an item is placed into a context, it is not possible to remove it, short of stopping the process that created the context. Since the contraction rule is freely available in intuitionistic logic, contexts can always be assumed to grow as the proof is developed from the bottom up. Such monotonicity is problematic in numerous settings.
When using an intuitionistic meta-logic to design theorem provers it is natural to use the meta-logic's context to manage object-level hypotheses and eigen-variables (Felty and Miller, 1988; Paulson, 1990) . With such an approach, however, there is no logical way to specify any variations of the contraction rule for the object logic: arbitrary contraction on all hypotheses is imposed by the meta-logic. A proposed technique for parsing relative clauses is to rst assume the existence of a noun phrase (a gap) and then attempt to parse a sentence (Pareschi, 1989) . Intuitionistic contexts do not naturally enforce the constraint that the assumed gap must be used while parsing the relative clause and that the gap cannot appear in certain positions (\island constraints" (Pereira and Shieber, 1987) ). Intuitionistic contexts can be used to manage a data base. While adding facts, querying facts, and performing hypothetical reasoning (\if I pass CS121, will I graduate") are easy to model using intuitionistic contexts, updating and retracting facts cannot be modeled straightforwardly (Bonner, McCarty, and Vadaparty, 1989; Gabbay and Reyle, 1984; Miller, 1989b) . A notion of state encapsulation (as in object-oriented programming) can be approximated using intuitionistic logic (Hodas and Miller, 1990) by representing an object's state with assumptions in a context. Updating that state, however, means changing those representative assumptions, and the only change allowed with intuitionistic contexts is augmentation. Thus, as computation progresses, an object's state becomes progressively more non-deterministic: seldom the desired notion of state. Each of these problems can be addressed by adopting a more re ned notion of context. In this paper, which is a revision and extension of a paper given at the 1991 Logic in Computer Science Symposium (Hodas and Miller, 1991) , we present a fragment of linear logic that makes a suitable logic programming language and permits very natural solutions to all of the above problems.
For the purposes of this paper we will characterize logic programming languages by concentrating only on logical connectives and quanti ers of rst-order logic. We will not address notions of control: in particular, we will equate the \execution" of logic programs with the non-deterministic bottom-up search for certain kinds of proofs. We shall mostly ignore the large number of issues that are involved in converting speci cations of computations, of the sort given here, to real computations. These issues are currently being studied by the authors.
Logic programming language design
Not all logics appear to be appropriate as the foundation of a logic programming language: while a weak logic such as Horn clauses clearly is appropriate for such a use, many richer logics do not seem to be. In a sense, logic programming should be based as much on a notion of \goal-directed search" as on the fact that it makes use of the syntax and semantics of logic. Full rst-order logic, for example, does not support this notion of goal-directed search. In previous work goal-directed search was formalized using the concept of uniform sequent proof (Miller, 1989b; Miller et al., 1991) . In this section we review the de nition of uniform proofs and present a logic programming language based on intuitionistic (actually minimal) logic that signi cantly extends Horn clauses. It is this logic programming language that we shall re ne with linear logic connectives in the next section.
It has been argued in various places, for example (Miller, 1989b; Miller et al., 1991) , that evaluation in logic programming is the search for certain simple, cut-free, sequent proofs. In such a view, a sequent ? ?! G denotes the state of an interpreter that is attempting to determine whether the goal G follows from the program ?. Goal-directed search is characterized operationally by the bottom-up construction of proofs in which right-introduction rules are applied rst and leftintroduction rules are applied only when the right-hand side is atomic. This is equivalent to saying that the logical connectives in a goal are decomposed uniformly and independently from the program: the program is only considered when the goal has a non-logical constant for its head | that is, when it is atomic. This idea is formalized for single conclusion sequent systems with the following de nitions.
De nition 1 A cut-free sequent proof is a uniform proof if for every occurrence in the proof of a sequent whose right-hand side is not atomic, that sequent is the conclusion of a right-introduction rule.
De nition 2 Let D and G be (possibly in nite) sets of formulas. The triple hD; G;`i is an (abstract) logic programming language if for every nite subset ? D and for every G 2 G, the sequent ? ?! G has a proof in the proof system`if and only if it has a uniform proof in`. The set D represents those formulas that are taken to be program clauses and the set G are those formulas that are taken to be goals.
Clearly, full rst-order classical and intuitionistic logics are not logic programming languages.
That is, if N is taken to be all rst-order formulas and`is taken to be either classical or intuitionistic provability, then the triple hN; N;`i is not a logic programming language, since in each case there are provable sequents, such as p _ q ?! q _ p, that have no uniform proofs.
An intuitionistic sequent calculus I for the logical connectives true;^; ; and 8 is given in Figure 1 . Here, the left-hand side of a sequent is intended to be a set: thus the structural rules of exchange and contraction are not needed. This follows from the fact that the pattern ?; a (denoting the set union of ? and fag) matches the set fa; b; cg in two ways: one assigns ? to fa; b; cg and the other to fb; cg. Because of the form of the identity inference, the structural rule for weakening is also not required. It should be noted that it is possible to formulate this logic with multisets of formulas (rather than sets), in which case the structural rules (except for exchange) would need to be made explicit. That formulation is relevant to the rst formulation of linear logic in the next section.
The expression ?`I G denotes the proposition that there is an I-proof of the sequent ? ?! G.
Gentzen's proof of cut-elimination (Gentzen, 1969) can be used to show that the cut rule in Figure 2 is admissible in I. Although it is possible to require ? = ? 0 in the cut rule, the more general form provided that y is not free in the lower sequent. given is useful in showing certain model-theoretic results. Cut will be stated in a similar form for the proof system given in Figure 7 and that form of cut will be used to advantage in Section 6 where a semantic result is presented.
Proposition 1 The triple hN 0 ; N 0 ;`Ii, where N 0 is the set of all formulas built from the logical constants true;^; ; and 8, and where`I is intuitionistic provability, is a logic programming language.
This proposition is proved by showing that given an I-proof it is always possible to permute enough inference rules to make it uniform. For a closely related proof see (Miller, 1989b) . The main proof in is concerned with a much stronger language that includes some forms of function and predicate quanti cation. It is possible to constrain uniform proofs in this logic even more and still not lose completeness. In particular, it is apparent from the proof of the last proposition that left-introduction rules are only needed to support backchaining. This observation involves two parts: rst, backchaining is a composition of several left-introduction rules and second, when an atomic goal is to be proved, there must be some particular formula on the left that can be processed completely to provide a subproof of that atomic goal. By extending this observation, Andreoli has developed an interesting generalization of backchaining, called focusing (Andreoli, 1992) .
These observations about backchaining are captured in the following proof system. Let B be a formula over the logical constants true;^; ; and 8, and de ne jBj to be the smallest set of pairs such that Informally, if h ; Ai 2 jBj then the formula B can be used to establish the formula A if each of the formulas in the set can be established; that is, A might be proved by backchaining over B.
Furthermore, backchaining can be limited to the case where the formula A is atomic. Let I 0 be the proof system that results from replacing the identity, L;^L, and 8L rules in Figure 1 with the backchaining inference rule in Figure 3 .
Proposition 2 Let ? fBg be a set of formulas over true;^; ; and 8. Then, the sequent ? ?! B has a proof in I if and only if it has a proof in I 0 .
Again, the proof of this follows from the permutability inference rules. Note that there is only one left-rule in I 0 , namely BC, and proofs in I 0 are necessarily uniform since BC applies only to sequents with atomic right-hand sides. The I 0 proof system provides a useful starting point for the implementation of an interpreter for this logic programming language.
Since it is only the impermutability of the left-hand rules for disjunction and existential quanti cation that keep uniform proofs from being complete for full rst-order intuitionistic logic, it is possible to introduce disjunctions and existential quanti ers as long as they never need to be introduced on the left. This is possible if they have only positive occurrences in (cut-free) proofs: that is, if they appear only positively in formulas on the right of sequents and negatively in formulas on the left of sequents. There are at least two ways that such a restriction can be maintained.
First, de ne the sets D 0 and G 0 to be the D and G-formulas given by the following mutual recursion:
If the I-proof system is extended with the introduction rules for _ and 9, the triple hD 0 ; G 0 ;`Ii is a logic programming language. The proof of this does not di er signi cantly from the proof of Proposition 1. It is, in fact, this language that is referred to as rst-order hereditary Harrop formulas in .
Alternately, we can use a slightly higher-order variant of the logic over just true;^; ; and 8 to \de ne" part of the meaning of disjunctions and existential quanti ers. In particular, consider the three higher-order Horn clauses (see Nadathur and Miller, 1990 , for a treatment of such clauses):
Here, _ and 9 are treated as non-logical symbols that have the types (as in Church's Simple Theory of Types (Church, 1940) ) o ! o ! o and (i ! o) ! o, respectively, where o is the type of propositions and i is the type of individuals. These clauses encode the right-introduction rules for disjunctions and existential quanti ers. In order to enforce the fact that these three clauses are to act as de nitions, it is necessary to restrict occurrences of the non-logical constants _ and 9 as in the paragraph above: _ and 9 can have no negative occurrences in a goal and no positive occurrences in program clauses other than the three clauses displayed above. This ensures that the only clauses that can be used to prove a disjunctive or existential goal are those given above. These two approaches amount to a description of the same logic programming language.
Throughout this discussion, the cut-elimination theorem has not played a major role, since computation in logic programming has been identi ed with the search for cut-free proofs. As we shall show in Section 6, the cut-elimination theorem plays the important \external" role of providing canonical models for logic programming languages.
A linear logic programming language
It is possible to assume, without loss of generality, that I 0 -proofs have the following property: if the sequents ? ?! B and ? 0 ?! B 0 have occurrences on the same path in a proof, with ? ?! B being closer to the endsequent, then ? ? 0 . Thus, as a computation builds a proof from the bottom up, the left-hand sides of sequents do not decrease. This limitation on the sort of changes that are allowed means that intuitionistic contexts are too simplistic for many desired uses of contexts in logic programming. Since contexts can be assumed to be non-decreasing, formulas in them are available for backchaining on any number of times; they represent unbounded resources for constructing proofs. Linear logic o ers a natural setting where notions of bounded and unbounded resource can be developed.
In order to re ne the logic programming language described in Section 2, we consider the linear logic connectives >; &; ; ? ; !, and 8. Proof rules for these connectives are given in Figure 4 and a cut rule for this proof system is given in Figure 5 . Here, the left-hand side of sequents are multisets of formulas. As a result, the structural rule for exchange need not be explicitly stated. The structural rules of contraction and weakening are given as the inference rules ! C (for contraction) and ! W (for weakening), but they are only available for formulas of the form ! B. The syntactic variable ! denotes the multiset f! C j C 2 g. We write `L L B if the sequent ?! B has a proof in the proof system of Figure 4 . Because all sequents in Figure 4 are single conclusion sequents, we shall be working completely within the \intuitionistic" fragment of linear logic. So far, only the logical connectives ? and ) have been motivated. Consider a sequent in which the bounded formulas are atomic. If the only logical connectives are ? and ) then every formula in the bounded part of the context must be used exactly once: that is, they must be accounted for in some identity inference rule by matching them with the same formula on the right of a sequent. Such rigid control of resources is limiting for most uses. For example, if a data base is held in the bounded part of a context, then querying the data base about an item makes that item unavailable elsewhere. Also, before a computation on the data base can be nished, it is necessary to \read" all items in this way. If, however, we add the connectives > and &, we have the ability to erase parts of the bounded context (using >) and to duplicate bounded contexts (using &). Thus, non-destructively reading a value from a data base can be achieved by rst making a copy of the data base from which we destructively read one item and delete the rest: the original data base is untouched. See Section 5.6 for an example of this kind of data base program speci cation. Figure 6 presents a proof system L for the logic connectives >; &; ? ; ), and 8. We write ?; `L B if the sequent ?; ?! B has a proof in L. Notice that the bounded part of the left premise of the ) L inference rule is empty: this follows from the structure of an LL-proof with an application of ? L to a formula of the form !B ? C. Notice as well that we assume without loss of generality that the identity inference of this system applies only where the right-hand side is an atomic formula. This technical restriction is used in the proof of Proposition 4 below. Figure 7 presents the two cut rules for L. Girard's proof of the cut-elimination theorem for linear logic (Girard, 1987a) can be adjusted to show that these two cut rules are admissible over L . A direct proof of cut elimination for this system can be found in the rst author's dissertation, which also includes complete proofs of the other proof-theoretic propositions in this paper (Hodas, provided that y is not free in the lower sequent. 1993). This particular presentation of the cut-rules will be useful in Section 6 when we characterize their admissibility in Proposition 9.
Proposition 3 The proof in each direction can be shown by presenting a simple transformation between proofs in the two proof systems.
Proposition 4 Let B be a formula, ? a set formulas, and a multiset of formulas all over the logical connectives >; &; ? ; ), and 8. The sequent ?; ?! B has a proof in L if and only if it has a uniform proof in L. Proof. In the reverse direction, the proof is immediate, since a uniform L-proof is certainly an Lproof. In the forward direction we provide a non-deterministic algorithm that converts an arbitrary L-proof to a uniform L-proof of the same endsequent. We de ne a non-uniform rule occurrence as any occurrence of a left-rule in which the right-hand side of the conclusion is not an atomic formula. We also note that the absorb rule is considered a left-rule. The rank of a non-uniform rule occurrence is the height of the subproof of the right-hand premise if the rule occurrence is either ? L or ) L or is the height of the subproof of the sole premise for any other left-hand rule occurrence. The algorithm is given as follows:
1. If the proof is uniform, terminate; otherwise, go to the next step.
2. Select a non-uniform rule occurrence with the property that the sub-proof(s) rooted at premise(s) of the rule are uniform. (That such a choice can be made is immediate given the assumption that identity inferences have only atomic right-hand sides.) Let C be the non-atomic right-hand side of the conclusion of this non-uniform rule occurrence. 3. One premise of the rule selected will be the conclusion of a right-rule that introduces the logical constant for C. There are only 25 such combinations of left-rules below right-introduction rules possible in an L-proof. For all of these cases, it can be checked that the left-rule permutes up through the right rule. We will only illustrate one case, where an instance of ? L occurs below an instance of &R, as displayed below: 
&R
At this point, it is necessary to call this procedure recursively on the sub-proofs rooted at the premises of the new nal rule, since new non-uniform rule occurrences may have been created immediately above. Fortunately, since such new occurrences of non-uniform rules will have strictly smaller ranks, this recursion will terminate. With the termination of the recursion(s), the number of non-uniform rule occurrences in the overall proof has been reduced by one. 4. Go to step 1.
Since each pass through the outer-loop of this algorithm reduces by one the number of non-uniform rule occurrences, the algorithm yields a uniform proof when it terminates. Thus, any sequent provable in L can be proved by a uniform L-proof.
Let N 1 be the set of all rst-order formulas over the logical connectives >; &; ? ; ), and 8. It follows immediately from Proposition 4 that the triple hN 1 ; N 1 ;`Li is an abstract logic programming language. (Here, we assume that formulas in N 1 can occur in both the bounded and unbounded parts of a sequent's left-hand side.)
As with system I 0 it is possible to restrict uniform proofs even further in the sense that the use of left-hand rules can be restricted to a form of backchaining. Consider the following de nition. Let the syntactic variable B range over the logical formulas containing just the connectives >; &; ? ; ), and 8. Then kBk is the smallest set of triples of the form h?; ; B 0 i where ? is a set of formulas and is a multiset of formulas, such that Figure 6 with the backchaining inference rule in Figure 8 . Let be an L-proof of ?; ?! B. Mark certain occurrences of formulas in the bounded part of some sequents in as follows. The unique formula in the bounded part of the conclusion of every identity rule is marked. By referring to Figure 6 we then mark additional formula occurrences using induction on the structure of proofs as follows: If the B i formula occurrence in the &L rule is marked, then mark the occurrence of B 1 & B 2 in its conclusion.
If the B t=x] formula occurrence in the 8L rule is marked, then mark the occurrence of 8x:B in its conclusion.
If the C formula occurrence in the right-hand premise of the ? L rule is marked, then mark the occurrence of B ? C in its conclusion If the C formula occurrence in the right-hand premise of the ) L rule is marked, then mark the occurrence of B ) C in its conclusion.
As in (Miller, 1989b) , an occurrence of a left-introduction rule is called simple if the occurrence of the formula containing the logical connective introduced is marked. A uniform proof in which all occurrences of left-introduction rules are simple is called a simple proof. Now observe two facts about simple proofs. First, if is simple, then can be transformed directly into an L 0 -proof: simply collapse all chains of left-introduction rules (following the marking process) into one BC inference rule. Second, by permuting inference rules, any uniform L-proof can be transformed into a simple proof. The proof of this is similar to the proof of Proposition 4. Find a non-simple occurrence of a left-introduction rule for which the subproofs of its premise(s) are simple proofs. One of the premises of this non-simple occurrence of a left-introduction rule must also be a left-introduction rule. Permute these two left-introduction rules. Consider, for example, the following case where these two left-introduction rules are ? L. way, all non-simple occurrences of left-introduction rules can be eliminated, giving rise to a simple proof, which can, as noted, be converted to an L 0 proof. Note that, unlike the system I 0 , proofs in L 0 are not necessarily uniform due to the presence of the absorb rule, which may act on sequents with non-atomic right-hand sides. Nevertheless, it is easy to see that all uses of this rule can be pushed up a proof tree so that they occur only immediately below instances of BC. Such L 0 proofs are then uniform.
As was noticed in Section 2, since we are only interested in cut-free proofs, it is possible to permit di erent sets of formulas to occur on the left and right of the sequent arrow. As in Section 2, there are at least two ways to do this. We can expand the logic by allowing some occurrences of additional logical constants, or we can use higher-order quanti cation with respect to the given logic to \de ne" the additional constants.
Using the rst approach, consider the following de nition of two classes of formulas over the logical constants >; 1; &; ; ; ? ; ); !; 8, and 9.
Here, R-formulas, called resource formulas, can appear in either part of the proof context (on the left of a sequent) while G-formulas, called goal formulas, can appear on the right of sequents. Given this extension, it is necessary to add to the proof system L 0 right-introduction rules for 1; ; ; ! and 9. Let L 00 be the proof system that results from adding the right-introduction rules in Figure 9 to L 0 . (Notice that since 1 is logically equivalent to ! >, it could be dropped from this de nition.)
In this same setting, it is also possible to use a more restrictive de nition for resource formulas (R-formulas):
( ) Although such a simpli cation does not change the expressiveness of the logic much, it makes the presentation of an interpreter for the logic simpler, as will be seen in Section 7.
The second approach does not extend the logic by adding these logical constants directly but instead axiomatizes their right-introduction rules using higher-order quanti cation. If we assume that there are no negative occurrences of any of these constants within a proof (except in these de ning formulas) then this amounts to the same restriction as in the rst approach.
An embedding of hereditary Harrop formulas
Girard has presented a mapping of intuitionistic logic into linear logic that preserves not only provability but also proofs (Girard, 1987a (Girard has pointed out to us that this proposition should be provable directly within his LU proof system (Girard, 1991) .) For another example, the natural deduction rule for implication-introduction, often expressed using the diagram (A) . . . B A B; can be written as the following rst-order formula for axiomatizing a truth predicate (see Felty, 1993; Felty and Miller, 1988; Paulson, 1990) :
where the domain of quanti cation is over propositional formulas of the object-language and imp is the object-level implication. This formula is written in Prolog using the syntax true (A imp B) :-true A => true B.
Given the above proposition, this formula can be translated to the formula 8A8B((true A ) true B) ? true (A imp B)); which means that the Prolog symbol => should denote ). Thus, in the implication introduction rule displayed above, the meta-level implication represented as three vertical dots can be interpreted as an intuitionistic implication while the meta-level implication represented as the horizontal bar can be interpreted as a linear implication.
Notice that when building L 00 -proofs of sequents translated from intuitionistic logic, the bounded part of sequents is non-empty only at the point that the backchaining rule is applied. If we relate this observation to the construction of normal -terms, where backchaining corresponds to the application of a typed constant or variable, we draw the (obvious) conclusion that every normal -term has exactly one head symbol.
In order to present several examples in the next section, we shall make use of the following syntactic conventions for specifying resource formulas and goal formulas. These conventions are motivated by the last proposition so that the syntax of Prolog and Prolog embed naturally into the extended language. The symbols , (comma), true, =>, and :-of Prolog and Prolog will be used here to represent , 1, ), and the converse of ? , respectively. In addition, we allow formulas to have occurrences of &, bang, erase, -o, and <=, which denote, respectively, &, !, >, ? , and the converse of ). We shall also adopt the standard convention that a token with an initial upper case letter that is not explicitly quanti ed in a formula is intended to be universally quanti ed (respectively, existentially quanti ed) around a resource formula (goal formula) with outermost scope. Finally, the clauses of a program are assumed to reside in the unbounded portion of an initial proof context.
Some example programs

Context management in theorem provers
Intuitionistic logic is a useful meta-logic for the speci cation of provability in various object-logics. For example, consider axiomatizing provability in propositional, intuitionistic logic over the logical symbols imp, and, or, and false (denoting object-level implication, conjunction, disjunction, and absurdity). A reasonable speci cation of the natural deduction inference rule for implication introduction is:
where pv and hyp are meta-level predicates denoting provability and hypothesis. (This speci cation of implication introduction is similar to that given in the preceding section.) Operationally, this formula states that one way to prove A imp B is to add the object-level hypothesis A to the context and attempt a proof of B. In the same setting, conjunction elimination can be expressed by the formula pv G :-hyp (A and B), (hyp A => hyp B => pv G).
This formula states that in order to prove some object-level formula G, rst check to see if there is a conjunctive hypothesis, say (A and B) , in the context and, if so, attempt a proof of G from the context extended with the two hypotheses A and B. Other introduction and elimination rules can be speci ed similarly. Finally, the formula pv G :-hyp G.
is needed to actually complete a proof. With the complete speci cation, it is easy to prove that there is a proof of (pv G) from the assumptions (hyp H1), : : :, (hyp Hi) in the meta-logic if and only if there is a proof of G from the assumptions H1, : : :, Hi in the object-logic. Unfortunately, an intuitionistic meta-logic does not permit the natural speci cation of provability in logics that have restricted contraction rules | such as linear logic itself | because hypotheses are maintained in intuitionistic logic contexts and hence can be used zero or more times. Even in describing provability for propositional intuitionistic logic there are some drawbacks. For instance, it is not possible to logically express the fact that a conjunctive or disjunctive formula in the proof context needs to be eliminated at most once. So, for example, in the speci cation of conjunction elimination, once the context is augmented with the two conjuncts, the conjunction itself is no longer needed in the context.
If, however, we replace the intuitionistic meta-logic with our re nement based on linear logic, these observations about use and re-use in intuitionistic logic can be speci ed elegantly, as is done in Figure 10 . In that speci cation, a hypothesis is both \read from" and \written into" a context during the elimination of implications. All other elimination rules simply \read from" the context; they do not \write back." The formulas represented by the last two clauses in Figure 10 use a with >: this allows for all unused hypotheses to be erased, since the object logic has no restrictions on weakening.
It should be noted that this speci cation cannot be used e ectively with a depth-rst interpreter because if the implication left rule can be used once, it can be used any number of times, thereby causing the interpreter to loop. Fortunately, improvements in the implication left-introduction rule are known. For example, the proof system given by Dyckho in (Dyckho , 1992) can be expressed directly in this setting by replacing the one formula specifying implication elimination in Figure 10 with the ve clauses for implication elimination and the (partial) axiomatization of object-level atomic formulas in Figure 11 . Executing this linear logic program in a depth-rst interpreter yields a decision procedure for propositional intuitionistic logic.
Toggling a switch
If we assume that the state of a switch is stored in the bounded part of the proof context using one of the atomic formulas on or off, then the following two clauses specify a higher-order predicate toggle that is provable of any formula G in a given context if G is provable when the switch is set to the opposite setting.
toggle G :-on, (off -o G). toggle G :-off, (on -o G).
While this example involves a quanti cation over propositions (the variable G), and as such is not strictly a rst-order speci cation, the intended meaning of the speci cation should be clear. Figure 12 (in which the set ? is assumed to contain the above two clauses for toggle) shows how a bottom-up search using these clauses might progress. This example illustrates an approach which has previously been used by the authors to provide a notion of object state in object-oriented logic programming (Hodas and Miller, 1990) . The linear re nement of hereditary Harrop formulas provides a straightforward declarative treatment of state update in that setting.
pv G :-hyp ((C imp D) imp B), ((hyp (D imp B) -o pv (C imp D)) & (hyp B -o pv G)). pv G :-hyp ((C and D) imp B), (hyp (C imp (D imp B)) -o pv G). pv G :-hyp ((C or D) imp B), (hyp (C imp B) -o hyp (D imp B) -o pv G
Permuting a list
Since the bounded part of contexts in L-proofs are intended to be multisets and not lists, it is a simple matter to permute a list by rst loading the list's members into the bounded part of a context and then unloading them. The latter operation is nondeterministic and can succeed once for each permutation of the loaded list. Consider the following simple program:
Here, nil denotes the empty list and :: the list constructor. The meaning of load and unload is dependent on the contents of the bounded part of the context, so the correctness of these clauses must be stated relative to a context. Let ? be a set of formulas containing the four formulas displayed above and any other formulas that do not contain either item, load, or unload as their head symbol. (The head symbol of a formula of the form A or G ? A is the predicate symbol that is the head of the atom A.) Let be the multiset containing exactly the atomic formulas item a 1 , : : :, item a n :
We shall say that such a context encodes the multiset fa 1 ; : : : ; a n g. It is now an easy matter to prove the following two assertions about load and unload:
The goal (unload K) is provable from ?; if and only if K is a list containing the same elements with the same multiplicity as the multiset encoded in . The goal (load L K) is provable from ?; if and only if K is a list containing the same elements with the same multiplicity as in the list L together with the multiset encoded in the context .
In order for load and unload to correctly permute the elements of a list, we must guarantee two things about the context: rst, the predicates item, load, and unload cannot be used as head symbols in any part of the context except as speci ed above and, second, the bounded part of a context must be empty at the start of the computation of a permutation. It is possible to handle the rst condition by making use of appropriate universal quanti ers over the predicate names item, load, and unload. Such an approach to the lexical scoping of names has been addressed in depth in previous papers (Miller, 1989a (Miller, , 1990 ) and will not be taken up here. The second condition | that the unbounded part of a context is empty | can be managed by making use of the modal nature of !, which we now discuss in more detail.
The modality of !
One extension to logic programming languages that has been studied for several years is the demopredicate (Bowen and Kowalski, 1982) . The intended meaning of attempting a query of the form demo(R; G) in context ? is simply attempting the query G in the context containing only R; that is, the main context is forgotten during the scope of the demo-predicate. The use of a !'ed goal has a related meaning.
Consider proving the sequent ?; ?! ! G 1 G 2 , where ? and are composed of resource formulas and G 1 and G 2 are goal formulas. Given the completeness of uniform proofs for the system L 00 , this is provable if and only if the two sequents ?; ; ?! G 1 and ?; ?! G 2 are provable. In other words, the use of the \of-course" operator forces G 1 to be proved with an empty bounded context. Thus, with respect to bounded resources, the goal !(R ? G) behaves similarly to demo(R; G). In a sense, since bounded resources can come and go within contexts during a computation, they can be viewed as \contingent" resources, whereas unbounded resources are \necessary". The of-course operator attached to a goal ensures that the provability of the goal depends only on the necessary and not the contingent resources of the context.
It is now clear how to de ne the permutation of two lists given the example program above: add either the formula
or, equivalently, the formula perm L K <= load L K.
to those de ning load and unload. Thus attempting to prove (perm L K) will result in an attempt to prove (load L K) with an empty bounded context. From the description of load above, L and K must be permutations of each other.
Multiset rewriting
The ideas presented in the permutation example can easily be expanded upon to show how the bounded part of a context can be employed to do multiset rewriting. Let H be the multiset rewriting system fhL i ; R i i j i 2 Ig where for each i 2 I (a nite index set), L i and R i are nite multisets.
De ne the relation M ; H N on nite multisets to hold if there is some i 2 I and some multiset C such that M is C ] L i and N is C ] R i . Let ; H be the re exive and transitive closure of ; H . Given a rewriting system H, we wish to specify a binary predicate rewrite such that (rewrite L K) is provable if and only if the multisets encoded by L and K stand in the ; H relation. Let ? 0 be the following set of formulas (these are independent of H):
Taken alone, these clauses give a slightly di erent version of the permute program of the last example. The only addition is the binary predicate rew, which will be used as a socket into which we can plug a particular rewrite system.
In order to encode a rewrite system H, each rewrite rule in H is given by a formula specifying an additional clause for the rew predicate as follows: If H contains the pair hfa 1 ; : : : ; a n g; fb 1 ; : : : ; b m gi then this pair is encoded as the clause:
rew K :-item a 1 , : : :, item a n , (item b 1 -o (: : : -o (item b m -o rew K)...)). If either n or m is zero, the appropriate portion of the formula is deleted. Operationally, this clause reads the a i 's out of the bounded context, loads the b i 's, and then attempts another rewrite. Let ? H be the set resulting from encoding each pair in H. As an example, if H is the set of pairs fhfa; bg; fb; cgi; hfa; ag; fagig then ? H is the set of clauses: One drawback of this example is that rewrite is a predicate on lists, though its arguments are intended to represent multi-sets, and are operated on as such. Therefore, for each M, N pair this program generates a factor of at least n! more proofs than the corresponding rewriting proofs, where n is the cardinality of the multiset N. This redundancy could be addressed either by implementing a data type for multi-sets or, perhaps, by investigating a non-commutative variant of linear logic.
A data base query language
A program that implements a simple data base query language is displayed in Figure 13 . To make this example interesting, we have augmented the language with the read, write, and nl (new line) input/output commands. We shall also assume that the sub-goals of a conjunction are attempted in a left-to-right order. The data base is stored in both the bounded and unbounded parts of the context using the unary predicate entry. Entries in the bounded part can be retracted or updated; entries in the unbounded context are permanent and cannot be updated or retracted. A session using this program might proceed as follows:
Command: enter (enroll jane cs1). Command: check (enroll jane X).
(enroll jane cs1) is an entry. Command: upd (enroll jane cs1) (enroll jane cs2). Command: check (enroll jane X).
(enroll jane cs2) is an entry. Command: commit (student jane). Command: enter (student bob). Command: necessary(student X).
(student jane) is a necessary entry Command: retract (student jane). Command: necessary (student X).
(student jane) is a necessary entry Command: necessary (student bob). Try again. Command: quit.
This example shows some limitations of linear contexts in this data base setting. For example, it does not seem possible to query a context to nd out if an entry is contingent and not necessary (although accommodating negation-as-failure would make this possible). Thus it is not possible (with just this logic) to check if a command is attempting to retract a necessary (committed) entry: as seen in the sample session, such an operation is accepted but ine ective.
A gap-threading parser for English relative clauses
Our nal example is a simple natural language parser which demonstrates how linear logic can be used to implement a technique known as gap threading (Pereira and Shieber, 1987) . Intuitionistic contexts have been proposed as a means of managing the introduction and scoping of gaps (Pareschi, 1989; Pareschi and Miller, 1990) . This approach, although modeling various aspects of gap-threading correctly, is unsatisfactory for at least two reasons. First, the restriction that a gap, once introduced, must be used is not easy to enforce using an intuitionistic context. Therefore, the phrase \whom Bob married Ann" would parse incorrectly as a valid relative clause. Second, various restrictions on where gaps may occur are not explained using intuitionistic contexts. For example, gaps introduced by \whom" can occur in object but not nominal positions. Thus the phrase \whom Ann believes that Bob married" is correct (the gap is the object of \married") while \whom Ann believes that married Bob" is incorrect (the gap is the subject of \married"). The \modal" distinction between these two kinds of noun phrases is not addressed naturally using intuitionistic logic.
The small logic program in Figure 14 is a simple parser based on de nite clause grammars (DCG) (Pereira and Warren, 1980) extended with some uses of linear logic. Each category of the grammar, such as sent for sentence, vp for verb phrase, sbar for complement clauses, etc., is given two arguments, denoting a di erence list of words. The rule for relative clauses (rel) introduces a gap by loading the formula all z\(np z z) (which denotes the logical expression 8z:(np z z)) into the bounded context. This formula represents a contingent resource: a noun phrase of zero length. Because of the restrictions placed on the management of the bounded context, the requirement that introduced gaps be consumed is handled by the logic.
The ! operator provides a simple mechanism for declaring that gaps cannot be consumed during the parsing of certain occurrences of parts of speech: for example, the subject noun phrase in the formula specifying sent is protected by a !. This blocks any contingent resources from being used in its proof. Thus, an introduced gap can be used to prove the noun phrase mentioned in the vp clause but not the one in the sent clause. Therefore, the two goals rel (whom::ann::believes::that::bob::married::nil) nil. rel (whom::bob::married::nil) nil.
are provable but the two goals rel (whom::ann::believes::that::married::bob::nil) nil. rel (whom::bob::married::ann::nil) nil.
are not. As this parser rules out subject extraction, sentences that require such extractions must be handled with additional specialized grammar rules. Several similar types of \island constraints" occur in natural language parsing problems (Pereira and Shieber, 1987) . The use of !'ed formulas may aid in handling these constraints as well.
The duplication of gaps across conjunctions in such phrases as \the doctor whom Bob married and Jane knew" can be explained well using a & to copy gaps. To this end, the following formula can be add to the grammar above to handle the conjunction of sentences: sent P1 P2 :-sent P1 (and::P3) & sent P3 P2.
The rst author has extended this application of linear logic to natural language processing (Hodas, 1992) . His dissertation also includes a set of extended examples along the lines of those given here (Hodas, 1993 ).
A model theoretic semantics
Besides the fact that logic programming languages can be characterized by their use of goal-directed search, they also generally share the characteristic that given a program, there exists a single model such that validity in that model is equivalent to provability from the program. Thus when designing a program (a proof context), a programmer can think of the meaning of a query operationally, as the search for uniform, cut-free proofs of the query in that context, or declaratively, as truth in the particular canonical model that the program represents.
The canonical model for rst-order Horn clauses is well known (Apt and van Emden, 1982) . A Kripke-like model construction was proposed in (Miller, 1989b) as the canonical model for a subset of rst-order hereditary Harrop formulas, but unfortunately the construction given there was not shown to be an actual model in the sense of possible-world semantics. A canonical model was given in (Miller, 1992) for the logic programming language described in Section 2. We shall use the approach given in (Miller, 1992) to develop a canonical model for the logic programming language based on >, &, ? , and ). We shall only consider the propositional case here since most of the aspects of the model are illustrated in just that simple setting. The analysis of the quanti cational case (including higher-type quanti cation) given in (Miller, 1992) applies equally well here. Let hR; +; 0i be a commutative monoid and let hW; i be a partially ordered set. We shall call R the monoid of bounded resources and W the set of possible worlds. A (propositional) Kripke interpretation is an order preserving mapping from hW; i to the powerset of the set of atomic formulas (here, propositional letters). A resource indexed model M is an R-indexed set of Kripke interpretations, fK r j r 2 Rg. Thus the set K r (w) is intended to denote the set of propositional formulas that are true at world w 2 W in interpretation K r .
Satisfaction in a structure M = fK r j r 2 Rg is de ned by the following induction on the structure of propositional formulas. K r ; w j = >. K r ; w j = A if A is atomic and A 2 K r (w). K r ; w j = B 1 & B 2 if K r ; w j = B 1 and K r ; w j = B 2 . K r ; w j = B 1 ? B 2 if 8r 0 2 R; 8w 0 2 W if w w 0 and K r 0 ; w 0 j = B 1 then K r+r 0 ; w 0 j = B 2 . K r ; w j = B 1 ) B 2 if 8w 0 2 W if w w 0 and K 0 ; w 0 j = B 1 then K r ; w 0 j = B 2 . Finally, we write M j = B if 8w 2 W, K 0 ; w j = B. In a sense, the Kripke interpretation K 0 models truth in the usual intuitionistic sense while K r models truth that has been moved out-ofphase (borrowing an image from Girard (Girard, 1987a) ) by the presence of the resource r 2 R.
The following lemma is proved by a simple induction on the structure of propositional formulas.
Lemma 7 Let r 2 R and w; w 0 2 W. If w w 0 and K r ; w j = B then K r ; w 0 j = B.
To aid in describing the satisfaction of sequents, we add the following rules for determining the satisfaction of 1 and . If we were investigating models for a logic that allowed unrestricted occurrences of 1 and , these satisfaction rules would need to be replaced by stronger rules. K 0 ; w j = 1. K r ; w j = B 1 B 2 if there are r 1 ; r 2 2 R such that r = r 1 + r 2 and K r 1 ; w j = B 1 and K r 2 ; w j = B 2 . We will need the following constructions. If ? is the set fC 1 ; : : : ; C n g ( . Thus there are r 1 ; r 2 ; r 3 2 R such that r = r 1 + r 2 + r 3 and K r 1 ; w j = 1 , K r 2 ; w j = 2 , and K r 3 ; w j = B ? C. By the validity of the rst sequent, K r 1 ; w j = B. By the de nition of the satis ability of ? , we know K r 1 +r 3 ; w j = C. By the validity of the second sequent, K r 1 +r 2 +r 3 ; w j = E. The following proposition describes how the canonical model for our logic programming language is built and shows that it has the desired properties.
Proposition 9 (Canonical Model Theorem) Let W be the set of all sets of formulas (over >, &, ? , and )) and let be set inclusion. Let R be the set of all multisets of such formulas and let + be multiset union and 0 be the empty multiset. De ne M = fK r j r 2 Rg by K r (w) = fA j A is atomic and w; r`L Ag: Then the equivalence 8w 2 W 8r 2 R(w; r`L B if and only if K r ; w j = B) holds if and only if the two cut rules are admissible in L. Proof. First, assume that the two cut rules are admissible in L. We proceed by induction on the structure of the formula B. In the base cases where B is atomic or >, the conclusion is immediate.
Similarly, in the inductive case where B is B 1 & B 2 , the conclusion also follows immediately. This leaves us with only the following two inductive cases to consider. 
A model of resource consumption
While we have shown several programming examples that demonstrate the usefulness of this logic programming language, we have said nothing about the practicality of implementing the language.
Given the rather simple structure of proofs in L 0 and L 00 , it is an easy matter to build a prototype interpreter for this logic programming language. For example, delaying the choice of universal instances of formulas on which to backchain using logic variables and uni cation as in other logic programming languages is an obvious option in this setting.
However, a serious computational issue that does not arise in traditional logic programming languages must be addressed. Nothing in the analysis made in Section 3 provides any guidance to an interpreter that is forced to divide up the multiset of bounded resource formulas in a proof context during the bottom-up application of the -R rule or the backchaining rule. For example, the sequent ?; ?! G 1 G 2 is provable if and only if there is a partitioning of the multiset into the two multisets 1 and 2 so that ?; 1 ?! G 1 and ?; 2 ?! G 2 are provable. So, if has cardinality n there are 2 n such partitions of . While it can be the case that for everyone of these partitions, the corresponding sequents are provable, it is much more likely (as in the examples of Section 5) that only very few of the partitions actually lead to proofs.
Clearly, a better strategy than trying each possible partition in sequence is needed if this is to be a usable logic programming language. Fortunately, given the restricted form of proof contexts, it is possible to view the process of proof building as one in which resource formulas get used and, if they are in the bounded part of the context, deleted. Thus, attempting to prove ?; ?! G 1 G 2 rst results in an attempt to prove, say G 1 , and as formulas in are used in backchaining inference rules in this proof, they are deleted. The resources deleted determine lazily the multiset 1 . If the search for a proof of G 1 is successful, the remaining multiset of formulas, implicitly equal to 2 , is then used to prove the second goal G 2 . If the correct resources are left to prove G 2 , then the compound goal G 1 G 2 will have been proved without splitting the context arti cially.
Assume that R-formulas are de ned as in Section 3. An IO-context is a list made up of Rformulas, !'ed R-formulas, or the special symbol del used to denote a place where an R formula has been deleted. The three-place proposition IfGgO will denote the fact that it is possible to nd a proof of G given the input I so that the resources in O remain. To make this informal notion precise, we need the following de nitions regarding IO-contexts. Figure 15 provides a speci cation of the predicate IfGgO for the propositional fragment of this logic that uses the clause ( ) of Section 3 to de ne R-formulas. The speci cation of IfGgO and of the other predicates for the full range of R-formula syntax is given using Prolog in Figure 16 .
In that presentation, IfGgO is written using the syntax prove(I,O,G), is written as x, ? as The Prolog code given implements only the propositional part of this logic since Prolog has no natural representation of object-level quanti cation. If Prolog (Nadathur and Miller, 1988) were used for the speci cation, such quanti ers could be implemented directly using -abstractions. The resulting speci cation would be identical to the one given in Figure 16 except that two more clauses | one for proving a universal quanti er and one for backchaining over a universal quanti er | would need to be added.
In We rst show by induction on a proof using the inference rules in Figure 15 
Related Work
There are many ways in which linear logic can be fruitfully exploited to address aspects of logic programming. Girard suggested how linear logic can be used to model the di erence between the classical, \external" logic of Horn clauses and the \internal" logic of Prolog that arises from the use of depth-rst search (Girard, 1987b) . His suggestions were worked out in detail by Cerrito (Cerrito, 1992) to provide a logical speci cation of Prolog evaluation for propositional Horn clauses. Cerrito has also used classical linear logic to provide a formalization of the Clark completion theory that is sound and complete for SLDNF on allowed logic programs (Cerrito, 1990) . Gabbay has used the ideas that arise from linear logic to isolate di erent computational aspects of proof search in a variety of systems in an attempt to identify complete yet e cient search techniques (Gabbay, 1991) . In particular, he was interested in those languages in which search may be restricted to using formulas linearly. This work is conceptually related to, though somewhat broader than, the recent work in linearizing intuitionistic implication by Lincoln, Scedrov, and Shankar (Lincoln et al., 1991) .
Besides our work described here, at least three proposals for new logic programming languages have been made recently that use linear logic (or, more precisely, substructural logics) for their foundation.
Andreoli and Pareschi have extended Horn clauses so that programs in the resulting language make use of the multiple conclusion nature of full linear logic (Andreoli, 1992; Andreoli and Pareschi, 1991) . In the logic programming language that results, the availability of context on the right-hand side of a sequent combined with the use of the`par' operator in the heads of clauses makes it possible to naturally support various aspects of concurrent and object-oriented programming.
Harland and Pym have proposed a fragment of linear logic as a logic programming language (Harland and Pym, 1991) . As was done here, their fragment is chosen so that uniform proofs remain complete. Since having !'s in right-hand side of sequents stops several inference rule permutations from holding, their proposal disallows such right-hand sides. Thus, goal formulas are weaker than those presented here, but contexts are richer. The loss of !'ed goals, however, means that several of the examples in this paper cannot be coded directly. The authors also describe a multipleconclusion variant of their system which captures some of the features of Andreoli and Pareschi's system.
Finally, Bollen has proposed a system which extends Prolog by adding relevant implication (Bollen, 1991) . In his system, assumptions added using an embedded implication can be duplicated but cannot be discarded. The main application discussed is to expert systems. As with this work, Bollen proposes a restriction of Gentzen systems to one in which goal-directed provability is complete. His restriction is based on the notion of invertibility, rather than permutability, however, which leads to a somewhat more restricted logical language than the one presented here. In particular, arbitrary nesting of quanti ers with implications is disallowed. In the end, Bollen's isR(erase). isR (B) :-isA(B). isR(B1 & B2) :-isR(B1), isR(B2). isR(B1 -o B2) :-isG(B1), isR(B2). isR(B1 => B2) :-isG(B1), isR(B2).
isG(1). isG(erase). isG(B)
:-isA(B). isG(B1 -o B2) :-isR(B1), isG(B2). isG(B1 => B2) :-isR(B1), isG(B2). isG(B1 & B2) :-isG(B1), isG(B2). isG(B1 x B2) :-isG(B1), isG(B2). isG(bang(B)) :-isG(B). while the second adds another copy of the assumption which can be used as many additional times as is needed. The relationship between L and Bollen's system is discussed in greater depth in the rst author's dissertation, where an extension of L allowing direct representation of relevant and a ne implication is also presented (Hodas, 1993) . In the area of natural language parsing, Lambek (Lambek, 1958 (Lambek, , 1987 has used a logic that can be identi ed with a non-commutative variant of linear logic to infer the syntactic categories of phrases. Recently, Pereira described how the semantics of gaps could be computed using a linear logic-like context mechanism (Pereira, 1990) : his approach can be formalized using the logic described here.
Conclusion
There have been several examples in print of the need to re ne the notion of intuitionistic context found in programs written using hereditary Harrop formulas (Felty and Miller, 1988; Hodas and Miller, 1990; Pareschi and Miller, 1990; Pereira, 1990) . In this paper, we proposed a re nement to hereditary Harrop formulas using a fragment of linear logic. We argued that this fragment is a sensible logic programming language by showing that interpreting it in a goal-directed fashion did not lead to incompleteness and that it has a model theory that admits canonical models. We presented an interpreter for this language that views proof construction as a process that takes in a context, deletes bounded formulas as they are used in backchaining and returns the remaining context to be consumed elsewhere. This interpreter splits contexts lazily when attempting a proof of a tensor. Finally, we presented several examples demonstrating the utility of this logic programming language.
A prototype interpreter, written in Standard ML, of the full logic programming language described here is available from the rst author.
